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Defendant/Appellant, North American Warranty Services, Inc. (hereinafter referred
to as "North American") hereby submits this Reply Brief to the Brief of PlaintifCAppellee,
David Pugh, (hereinafter referred to as "Pugh").
PREFACE
Pugh contends that North American failed to preserve the issues on appeal or, in the
alternative, that North American's failure to include the trial transcript as a portion of the
record deprives this Court of the ability to determine if the issues were preserved on appeal,

or to determine the sufficiency of the evidence, or to marshal the evidence to successfully
contest any of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact. (Pugh's Brief, pg. 8). These allegations,
for the reasons set forth below, are without merit.
First, as noted by Pugh, this case was "by nature, a contract dispute" involving "a
claim which Pugh made on a Vehicle Service Contract." (Pugh's Brief, pg.3). Prior to trial,
the parties prepared and presented to the Trial Court a Statement of Stipulated Facts, which
statement included the subject Vehicle Service Contract and the facts relevant to this case.
(Findings of Fact, pg. 1). The issues on appeal concern the interpretation and legal effect of
the Vehicle Service Contract, which is undisputedly a part of the record.
Second, as also noted by Pugh, there was only one witness, the Appellee, Mr. Pugh.
Since the nature of the case was one of contract, and the parties stipulated to the relevant
facts, the trial testimony of Mr. Pugh was unnecessary to the issues on appeal. There was
no reason for North American to obtain a trial transcript for the appeal since the evidence
was presented and preserved by the Statement of Stipulated Facts.
Finally, Pugh's allegation that the failure to designate the trial transcript "by
definition, makes it impossible for North American to marshal the evidence" is ludicrous,
and Pugh offers no authority for his position. Again, the material facts and the exhibits were
presented to the Trial Court by Stipulation. Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure provides that a trial transcript is not mandatary, but is discretionary to the parties.
Since the relevant facts and exhibits were submitted to the Trial Court by Stipulation, North
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American elected not to obtain a transcript of the proceedings at trial, since a transcript was
not necessary to the issues on appeal.
POINT I
THE CONTRACT AT ISSUE IS NOT
A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE
A. THE CORRECTNESS OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
VEHICLE SERVICE CONTRACT WAS A CONTRACT OF INSURANCE WAS
PRESERVED FOR APPEAL.
In Conclusion of Law No. 11, the Trial Court concluded that:
Attorney's fees are recoverable, even in the absence of contract
or statute, in the case of insurance contracts where the fees are
foreseeable consequential damages arising form [sic] the
insurer's breach of its obligations. The warranty contract at
issue is an insurance contract for the purposes of an award of
attorney's fees,. ..
The issue before the Trial Court was whether attorney's fees were awardable as
consequential damages as a result of the breach of the Vehicle Service Contract. In its
Answer, North American denied that such consequential damages were available, and the
award of attorney's fees as consequential damages was also opposed in North American's
Trial Memorandum.
Pugh's Complaint did not refer to the Vehicle Service Contract as an insurance
contract. Pugh also stipulated that he purchased a Vehicle Service Contract, not a policy of
insurance. Nonetheless, the Trial Court concluded that attorney's fees were awardable as
consequential damages because the Vehicle Service Contract was an insurance contract, even
though the pleadings and stipulated facts established otherwise.
3

Under Hart v. Salt Lake County Commission. 945 P.2d 125,130 (Utah App. 1997),
to preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a party: (1) must raise the issue before the Trial
Court; (2) the Trial Court must be aware of the issue; and (3) the party must introduce to the
Trial Court supporting evidence or relevant legal authority. As set forth above, North
American challenged the award of attorney's fees as consequential damages in both its
Answer, and at trial through its Trial Memorandum which contained legal authority. The
very fact that the Trial Court made Conclusion of Law No. 11 demonstrates that the issue
was raised before the Trial Court, and that the Trial Court was aware of the issue, but
rejected the legal authority cited by North American.
The fact that the Trial Court ruled against North American based on legal authority,
other than that cited by North American, does not mean that the issue itself, whether
attorney's fees are awardable as consequential damages, was not raised before the Trial
Court. The issue was clearly raised, and now it should be reviewed for correctness since it
is a conclusion of law.
B. BECAUSE THE VEHICLE SERVICE CONTRACT IS NOT A
CONTRACT OF INSURANCE, THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.
(1)

The exception allowing for the award of attorney's fees where

insurance policies are involved must be narrowly construed.
The Court in Collier v. Heinz. 892 P.2d 982 (Utah App. 1992) stated:
[A] broad application of Bracey is not reasonable because it
would eviscerate the general rule; attorney fees would be
4

awarded virtually every time a party is found in breach of its
contract.
***

The award of attorney's fees as consequential damages, outside
the context of statutory and contractual authorization, should be
limited to the two situations noted above: insurance contracts,
and the third-party exception.
The Court continued in Collier:
. . . No reported decision in Utah has applied the Bracey
consequential damages theory outside the context of insurance
contracts.
Collier at 984.
Since every contract can be considered to shift risk in one form or another, if Pugh's
argument prevails, the flood gates allowing consequential damages in every contract case
would be opened, and the long standing rule that attorney's fees cannot be recovered unless
expressly provided for by statute or contract would be nullified. Accordingly, this Court
must narrowly construe any attempt to broaden the Bracey exception.
(2) The legislature has determined that service contracts are not
contracts of insurance.
The Trial Court held that "[T]he warranty contract at issue is an insurance contract
for the purposes of an award of attorney's fees." (Conclusion of Law No. 11, R/l 52). North
American, in its initial Brief, addressed this issue in detail, noting that the legislature
determined specifically that a "service contract" is not a contract of insurance, and
accordingly, exempted such contractsfromthe application of the provisions of the Insurance
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Code. (Utah Code Ann. §31A-l-103(3)(iV). The legislature could have defined "vehicle
service contracts" as being insurance, and made such contracts subject to the Insurance Code,
but it did not. The legislature in failing to characterize a Vehicle Service Contract as
insurance, clearly indicated that service contracts are not insurance. This Court must give
effect to the intent of the legislature. See Craftsman Builder's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg.
Co.. 974 P.2d 1194 (Utah 1999); Savage Industries. Inc. v. Utah State Tax Com'n.. 811 P.2d
664 (Utah 1991); Rowley v. Public Service Commission. 185 P.2d514,112 Utah 116 (Utah
1947).
(3)
insurance.

The Vehicle Service Contract is not mechanical breakdown

Pugh, at page 13 of his Brief, argues that North American9 s contract with Pugh

is "mechanical breakdown insurance" policy rather than a "service contract". This argument
is without merit, or supported by law or relevant code sections.
First, the subject Vehicle Service Contract was not issued by an insurance company
as required by Utah Code Ann. §31A-6a-101(l).
Second, the Vehicle Service Contract provides for incidental payment of indemnity
under limited circumstances, i.e., rental and towing, which meets the definition of a Vehicle
Service Contract under Utah Code Ann. §3 lA-6a-101(3)(a). (See Statement of Stipulated
Facts, Exhibit A, R/52-86).
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Third, the Vehicle Service Contract is in substantial compliance with the requirements
of Utah Code Ann. §31A-6a-104, for required disclosures for Services Contracts.1
Fourth, the Vehicle Service Contract does not violate any of the prohibited acts as set
forth in Utah Code Ann. §3 lA-6a-105, since it does not use in the contract words indicating
"insurance59, "casualty," "surety", "mutual", or any other words descriptive of the insurance,
casualty, or surety business. Contrary to Pugh's argument, the Vehicle Service Contract,
by reason of its failure to specifically include the phrases in Utah Code Ann §3 lA-6a-104
(2) and (11), does not become "mechanical breakdown insurance".
Mechanical breakdown coverage is issued by an insurance company subject to all the
statutory insurance code provisions, and is specifically called "insurance". On the other
hand, the legislature has made it clear that under Utah Code Ann. §3 lA-6a-103(4) and (5),
service contracts are not subject to the usual licensing and regulations imposed on insurance
companies and insurance agents. A service contract is merely defined as a "contract" or

1

As noted by Pugh, the Vehicle Service Contract does not contain the specific statements
contained in subparagraphs (2) and (11), but the contract does conspicuously provide that it is
"Administered by North American Warranty Services, Inc. *2907 Butterfield Road, Oakbrook,
Illinois 60521*1-800-462-2452" in two locations. The Vehicle Service Contract does identify the
provider, the seller, and the service contract holder, as provided in subparagraph (3); it does
conspicuously state the total purchase price, as provided in subparagraph (4); it does conspicuously
provide the process for approval of repair work, as provided by subparagraph (5); the contract does
conspicuously state the amount of the applicable deductible, as provided by subparagraph (6); the
contract does specify the services to be provided and the limitations, exceptions and exclusions, as
provided by subparagraph (7); it does state the terms governing the transferability, as provided by
subparagraph (9); and, it does provide the terms governing cancellation, as provided in subparagraph
(10).
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"agreement". If both would have been considered insurance, there would have been no need
for the legislature to enumerate two different types of coverage.
Pugh next argues, again without citation to any authority, that the Vehicle Service
Contract has the characteristics of the services of a "Motor Club", and therefore, is subject
to the Utah Insurance Code. Pugh's reasoning is that the Vehicle Service Contract provides
for trip reimbursement, towing services, and emergency road services. (Pugh Brief at page
14). This argument is without merit, since a service contract may, as part of its very statutory
definition, include additional provisions for incidental payment of indemnity under limited
circumstances. Utah Code Ann. $31-61-101 (3)(a).
The Vehicle Service Contract is a service contract as defined by Utah law, and as a
service contract, it is not insurance. Since the Vehicle Service Contract is not an insurance
policy, the Bracey exception allowing for consequential damages where an insurance policy
is involved does not apply. It was error for the Trial Court to award attorney's fees as
consequential damages. The judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES
WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE PLEADINGS,
FINDINGS OF FACT, OR THE EVIDENCE
A.
PUGH FAILED TO PLEAD A BREACH OF THE IMPLIED
COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH.
Pugh argues, at page 15 of his Brief:

8

North American raises, for thefirsttime on appeal, the argument
that the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees as consequential
damages for breach of the implied covenant of good faith
performance is error because it was not properly pleaded.
Pugh's argument is confusing and without merit, since Pugh acknowledges in the very
next paragraph " the [his] Complaint does not set forth a separately identified cause of
action for breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance,..." Since the issue
of good faith performance was not an issue raised by Pugh in his Complaint or at trial, the
first time that good faith performance became an issue was when the Trial Court awarded
attorney's fees as consequential damages. As such, the first time North American could
raise this issue was on appeal based upon the error of the Trial Court awarding relief under
a theory which was not plead or presented to the Trial Court.
This Court has held that:
The fundamental purpose of the liberalized pleading rules is to
afford parties 'the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate
contentions that they have pertaining to their dispute, subject
only to the requirement that their adversaries have "fair
notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a
general indication of the type of litigation involved/'
(Emphasis added).
Consolidated Realty Group v. Sizzling Platter, Inc.. 930 P.2d 268, 275 (Utah App. 1996);
Williams v. State Farm Ins. Co..656 P.2d 966, 971 (Utah 1982). North American was not
given any notice, in the pleadings or at trial, that the issue of a breach of the implied
covenant of good faith was to be litigated at trial.
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The theories pled by Pugh for relief were breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and
misrepresentation. (R/l A-J). The case was tried to the Trial Court based upon a Statement
of Stipulated Facts, (R/52-86), which also did not provide for a claim that North American
breached the implied covenant of good faith of an insurance contract. Since Pugh had not
pled a breach of a covenant of good faith, it was reversible error for the Trial Court to find
such a breach.
B.
THE ISSUE OF A BREACH OF THE IMPLIED COVENANT OF
GOOD FAITH WAS NOT IMPLIEDLY PLEAD OR LITIGATED.
Pugh argues in his Brief that the Complaint did "set forth sufficient facts and elements
to fairly apprize North American" of a claim of the breach of the implied covenant of good
faith (Pugh Brief, page 15), and that "the tell-tale requests for attorney's fees as
consequential damages gave North American fair warning that Pugh had incorporated a
breach of the implied covenant of good faith performance into his Complaint." (Pugh Brief,
page 16). However, Pugh requested attorney's fees as a "catch-all" in each of his causes of
action, since none of these causes of action entitled Pugh to an award of attorney's fees.
Moreover, the facts which Pugh claims support the allegation of breach of good faith are also
consistent with Pugh's claim of a breach of contract. North American was not given fair
notice of the claim of a breach of the implied covenant of good faith as is required by Rule
8 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Rosenlof v. Sullivan. 676 P.2d 372,374 (Utah
1983). Sjmce the issue of good faith was not impliedly plead or litigated, it was error for the
Trial Court to conclude that there was a breach of the covenant of good faith.
10

C.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT FIND THAT NORTH AMERICAN
HAD VIOLATED ITS IMPLIED DUTY OF GOOD FAITH.
In the absence of a legal finding that North American had violated its implied duty of
good faith, the Trial Court's award of attorney's fees as consequential damages is reversible
error. As noted in Collier, supra., at 984, "Bracey, Zions, and Beck all dealt with the issue
of awarding damages when an insurer in some way breaches its contract with an insured".
(Emphasis added). In this case, there was neither a contract of insurance, nor was there a
specific conclusion of law that North American breached the implied covenant of good faith.
The Trial Court did make a number of findings which arguably would support a
conclusion of a breach of the implied duty of good faith. The Trial Court also made a
number of findings which would support a conclusion that North American acted in good
faith. At paragraph 7 of the Findings of Fact, the Trial Court found:
Following the breakdown on May 26, 1997, defendant
instructed its agent, Ken Riddle, to perform a visual inspection
and test drive on May 30, 1997. The inspection was timely . .
. (Emphasis added).
Since the Trial Court did not specifically find a breach of the covenant of good faith,
there is no basis for awarding attorney's fees as consequential damages. The Trial Court's
award of attorney's fees must be reversed.
D.

THE ISSUE OF GOOD FAITH WAS NOT TRIED BY CONSENT.

Pugh next argues:
Even if this Court determines that the breach of implied
covenant of good faith performance theory was not adequately
pleaded by Pugh in his Complaint, it was nonetheless
n

appropriate for the Trial Court to consider evidence submitted
on the theory and grant recovery thereon because the issue was
tried by consent. (Pugh Brief, page 16).
Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure does allow the Trial Court to
consider and rule on issues not present in the pleadings, provided the issue is "tried by the
express or implied consent of the parties." In this case, there was neither express or implied
consent to try the issue of a breach of the duty of good faith. Pugh did not plead a breach
of the implied covenant of good faith, and the evidence, which in this case consisted of the
Statement of Stipulated Facts, does not demonstrate such an implied consent.
Pugh next claims that North American's failure to object to the introduction of the
Affidavit of Attorneys Fees and Costs submitted by his counsel is evidence of an implied
consent to try the issue of breach of good faith. (Pugh Brief, page 18). The Affidavit of
Attorneys Fees was submitted without objection by North American since it merely
summarized the testimony of Pugh's counsel on the subject, and North American did not
contest the reasonableness of the hours spent, nor the reasonableness of the hourly charge.
While North American believed that none of the theories pled by Pugh entitled him to fees,
and objected to their award as consequential damages, the Complaint did contain a request
for fees. The fact that North American did not contest their reasonableness can hardly be
construed as an acquiescence to trying an issue not pled, especially where there was a request
for fees under each cause of action, and there was an objection to their award.
E.
NORTH AMERICAN'S HANDLING OF THE CLAIM WAS
REASONABLE AND THE CLAIM WAS DEBATABLE.
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Pugh, at page 20 of his Brief, argues "North American raises for the first time the
purported defense that its obligation to cover Pugh's claim was fairly debatable55. As noted
above, this case was tried to the Court based upon Stipulated Facts. The facts that
demonstrated North American's good faith in handling the claim, and that the claim was
debatable, included the following Stipulated Facts (R/52-86):
17. On April 22, 1996, the subject vehicle developed
transmission trouble. Defendant [North American] paid a claim
for $1,368.25 to Transmission Exchange to replace the
transmission with a rebuilt transmission. That payment is
included with in the total payments set forth in Paragraph 14.
26. Defendant [North American] instructed Parkway Motors to
reinstall the transmission pan and fluid so that it could be test
driven.
27. On May 30,1997, an agent of Defendant [North American],
Ken Riddle, came to Parkway Motors to inspect the subject
vehicle. Pursuant to his instructions from Defendant, Riddle
visually inspected the transmission and drove the vehicle.
28. Riddle prepared a report indicating that the transmission
pan had metal flecks in it, the transmission fluid smelled burnt,
and there were leaks from exterior housing seal. After test
driving the vehicle for 11 miles, Riddle noted that the
transmission shifted roughly into overdrive. A true and correct
copy of Riddle's report is attached hereto as Exhibit E.
29. After Riddle's test drive, Defendant [North American]
authorized only the replacement of the rear transmission seal.
The Utah Supreme Court held in the case of Billings v. Union Bankers his. Co., 918
P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996):
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. . . When an insured's claim is fairly debatable, the insurer is
entitled to debate it and cannot be held to have breached the
implied covenant if it chooses to do so.. . .
The first question presented is whether... .a first-party insurer
may be held liable for breaching the implied covenant on the
ground that it wrongfully denied coverage if the insured's
claim, although later found to be proper, was fairly debatable
at the time it was denied. (Emphasis added).
The Trial Court, as noted by Pugh at page 21 of his Brief, failed to address in its
Conclusions of Law the issue of whether the claim at the time it was made was fairly
debatable. The issue was raised by the Stipulated Facts.
North American paid for numerous and expensive repairs to Pugh's vehicle, including
the replacement of a transmission a little more than a year prior to the incident which is the
subject of Pugh's Complaint. (Stipulated Facts, paragraphs 14 and 17, R/52-86). North
American, upon being advised of Pugh's problem, immediately retained Ken Riddle to
inspect the vehicle. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 27, R/52-86). Mr. Riddle test drove Pugh's
vehicle without incident, only noticing that the 1990 Ford Thunderbird shifted hard into
overdrive. (R/52-86). Mr. Riddle noted on his inspection that the cause of the failure was
"oil leaked from trans seal". (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 27, R/52-86). North American
authorized replacement of the rear transmission seal. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 29, R/5286). Pugh demanded a replacement transmission without first determining the extent of the
damage to his transmission, or if a covered part required replacement. The Vehicle Service
Contract did not impose upon North American a duty to perform diagnostic tests or
evaluations, and the Vehicle Service Contract only required North American to repair or
14

replace defective covered parts. (Stipulated Facts paragraph 7, R/52-86). The Vehicle
Service Contract did not give North American authority to approve diagnostic procedures on
the transmission. Pugh, however, did have authority to request diagnostic tests, which tests
could have been completed at a minimal cost. (Tear down costs were $250.00 as indicated
in Findings of Fact No. 41).
The failure of the Trial Court to make findings on all material issues is reversible error
unless the facts in the record are "clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a
finding in favor of the judgment". Action v. J. B. Deliran. 737 P.2d 996, 998 (Utah 1987).
The Trial Court failed to make a finding on the critical issue of the debatability of Pugh's
claim to North American at the time it was made. The facts do not clearly and
uncontrovertedly support a finding that the claim was not debatable at the time it was made.
As such, the judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed.
POINT III
THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MITIGATE HIS DAMAGES
A.
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY APTLY THE
EQUITABLE DOCTRINE OF MITIGATION.
Pugh acknowledged that the appropriate standard under Utah law is that a party
seeking damages must take reasonable actions to mitigate his damages. (Pugh Brief, pg. 25)
Utah Courts have held:
The recognized rule is that where one party definitely indicates
that he cannot or will not perform a condition of a contract, the
other is not required to uselessly abide time, but may act upon
15

the breach condition. Indeed in appropriate circumstances he
ought to do so to mitigate damages.
University Club v. Invesco Holding Corp.. 504 P.2d 29 (Utah 1972).
[t]he nonbreaching party "may not, either by action or inaction,
aggravate the injury occasioned by the breach, but ha[s] a duty
to actively mitigate his damages". Utah Farm Prod. Credit
Ass 'n v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62, 64 (Utah 1981). See also Angelos v.
First Interstate Bank of Utah, 627 P.2d 772, 777 (Utah 1982);
John Call Eng'g v. Manti City, 795 P.2d 678, 680 (Utah App.
1990); Reinstatement (Second) of Contracts, Sec. 350 (1981).
Anesthesiologists Associates of Ogden v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 852 P.2d 1030 (Utah App.
1993).
Pugh, at page 26 of his Brief, confuses the issue of the tear down costs of the
transmission with the repair costs of the transmission. Pugh accurately states the Trial
Court5 s finding that Pugh lacked the financial ability to pay for repair costs. (Finding of Fact
No. 14, R-148). However, the Trial Court did not conclude that Pugh did not have the
financial ability to pay the "tear down" costs ($275.00) of the transmission to determine if
the transmission required repair. The tear down cost is the operative cost to determine if
mitigation was reasonable and prudent.
The Trial Court found in Conclusion of Law No. 7 (R/145-154):
There is no Utah case precisely on point, but a Texas Civil
Appeals case is instructive, and no Utah case holds to the
contrary. In Mondragon v. Austin, 954 S.W.2d 191 (Tex App.
1997), the court held that the plaintiff had a duty to mitigate
damages if he can do so "at a trifling expense or with reasonable
exertions." IdL at 195. While this court would require mitigation
to extend somewhat beyond "trifling59 expense, a plaintiff does
not need to impoverish himself to limit a breaching party's
exposure.
16

The undisputed stipulated fact was the tear down of the transmission was $275.00.
North American submits that the sum of $275.00 would be unlikely to impoverish Pugh. The
Trial Court also ruled in Conclusion of Law No. 7 as follows:
However,fromapproximately May 30,1998, when the majority
of the repair costs had been tendered, Parkway Motors had
agreed to proceed with repairs, but not release the vehicle until
the final $225.00 was paid, and four days had elapsed during
which repair could have been accomplished, plaintiffs
obligation to mitigate was triggered....
It is reasonable to assume that if a bill for $225.00 triggered Pugh's obligation to
mitigate damages, a bill which was only $50.00 more to determine the extent of the damage
to the transmission would be reasonable, and also trigger Pugh's obligation to mitigate his
damages.
Pugh next argues that subjecting the ailing transmission to diagnostic tests to
determine the need for repair placed him in jeopardy of voiding the Vehicle Service Contract.
Pugh points to the provisions of the Vehicle Service Contract where it refers to any
"alteration, tampering, disconnection, improper adjustment or repairs" and "the administrator
must be contacted prior to the performance of any repair" and "any repairs performed to the
covered vehicle not specifically authorized" (Pugh Brief, pg 26). Pugh's argument is without
merit, as the provisions referenced by Pugh concern alterations and unauthorized repairs, not
diagnostic tests to determine the existence of damage.
The reasonable action by Pugh to mitigate his damages would have been to have the
transmission inspected at a cost of $275.00. Upon verification of the needed repairs, North
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American would have paid for the repairs, as it had in the past when the need for repairs was
confirmed. The Trial Court's ruling on mitigation is inconsistent with Utah law, and should
be reversed.
POINT IV
NORTH AMERICAN HAS SUFFICIENTLY
MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE
Pugh again argues that since North American did not obtain a trial transcript, this
Court is incapable of making any determination of the issues. (Pugh Brief, pg 30). The facts
relevant and binding on the Trial Court were set forth in the Statement of Stipulated Facts
(R/52/86), which were incorporated by the Trial Court in its Findings of Fact. (R/145-154).
The facts were stipulated and made a part of the Court record, and are sufficient to enable
this Court to rule on the issues. The trial transcript was not necessary, and the only
marshaling required is that which can be gatheredfromthe Stipulated Facts.

POINT V
ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL
Pugh claims that he should be awarded attorney fees if he prevails on appeal. (Pugh
Brief, pg. 30). For this conclusion, Pugh references the following as support:
(a)

[T]he rule of law that "a provision for payment of
attorney's fees in a contract includes attorney's fees
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal as well as at
trial".

(Pugh Brief, pg 30) However, there is no contract provision for attorney's fees in this case.
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(b)

[T]he rule of law which permits recovery of contractbased attorney's fees appeal has been extended to
domestic litigants.

(Pugh Brief, pg. 30). This is not a domestic litigation lawsuit, nor is there an applicable
statute similar to Utah Code Ann. §30-3-3, which allows the Trial Court to order a party to
pay attorney's fees.
(c)

[T]o mechanic's lien claimants based on the statute.

(Pugh Brief, pg. 31). This is not a lien claim lawsuit, nor is there an applicable statute
similar to Utah Code Ann. §31-1-18, authorizing attorney fees as in mechanic lien lawsuits.
(d)

[T]o attorney's fees awarded for bad faith. Utah
Department of Social Services v. Adams. 806 P.2d 1193
(UtahApp. 1991).

(Pugh Brief, pg. 31). This was a case where the Department of Social Services brought an
action against an ex-husband for child support. Attorney's fees were based upon the
Department of Social Service's bad faith and determination that the suit was frivolous. The
Court also referred to Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 33 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. (See Dept. at 1198). This case is not on point for the
conclusion submitted by Pugh.
Pugh is not entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal
CONCLUSION
The Judgment of the Trial Court should be reversed for the reasons set forth by North
American.
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of September, 1999.

ROBERT W. HUGHES
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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